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stances justify an exception.28 The nature of the interest invaded by
a stomach search should be given more protection than is given to
the interest in the sanctity of the automobile. An independent judicial determination of probable cause would help to ensure that
the stomachs of innocent persons are not searched without legal
justification.
Certainly it will not always be practicable for border agents to
obtain search warrants before making this type of search. When
probable cause for a stomach search arises at the border, it may endanger the suspect's life to require him to wait until a warrant is
procured. 19 In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, border
agents should be judicially encouraged to obtain search warrants.
The public interest in preventing entry of narcotics into the United
States makes it imperative that border agents be empowered to discourage and combat "stomach smuggling." The Levin tube search
may conceivably be the only means of suppressing this traffic. If the
determination of probable cause for such searches is made by an impartial judicial officer when possible, international travelers will receive
maximum protection against indiscriminate and unreasonable use
of the stomach pump.
THOMAS C. COBB
ROBERT L. MooRE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: USE OF PEYOTE AS A FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION
State v. Bullard,267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E. 2d 565 (1966)
Police officers, pursuant to a search warrant, entered the defendant's apartment and discovered a small quantity of marijuana and
approximately twelve "buttons" of peyote, a variety of cactus that,
if taken internally, produces hallucinations. The defendant was subsequently charged with the violation of two North Carolina statutes
that, inter alia, outlawed the possession, sale, or control of narcotic
18. Ibid.
19. The likelihood that containers of narcotics will dissolve or rupture increases in proportion to the length of time the containers are allowed to remain

in the body.
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drugs, including peyote and marijuana.' In a criminal prosecution
for violation of these statutes the defendant testified that he was a
Peyotist and member of the Neo-American Church, a religious organization that considers the use of peyote and marijuana a necessary
and integral part of its ceremonies. The defendant further asserted
that conviction for possession of a substance necessary for the
practice of his religion would violate his first amendment right to
free exercise of religion, incorporated by the fourteenth amendment
and made obligatory on the states.2 Defendant was convicted on two
charges of possession of peyote and marijuana. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, HELD, the first amendment of
the United States Constitution does not authorize a person to commit
acts that threaten the public safety, morals, peace, and order. Judgment affirmed.
It is generally settled that a state may abridge religious practices
only to prevent "grave and immediate danger to interests which the
state may lawfully protect."' 3 States have constitutionally prohibited
the practice of bigamy4 the giving of intoxicants to minors,5 and the
nefarious religious ceremonies of the so-called "snake cults, ' 6 even
though the individual defendant's religious convictions dictated such
practices. In Sherbert v. Verner 7 the United States Supreme Court
examined the problem of determining when a state may constitutionally curtail a religious practice and promulgated a three-step solution.
In that case the Court first asked whether the belief of the particular
sect or person was held in good faith. This initial phase presented
an issue to be determined in the first instance by the trier of fact, not
by the appellate courts. When the impugned belief was found to
be bona fide, the Court then asked whether the allegedly unconstitutional statute, as applied, burdened the free exercise of religion.
When affirmatively answered, the Court asked finally whether some
compelling state interest justified the infringement.
The three-level approach utilized by the Court in Sherbert was
motivated by an attempt to balance the state police power and the
individual's first amendment right to freely exercise his religion. By
allowing the trier of fact to determine whether the particular re1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § §90-87 (I)d, -87 (9), -88 (1964).
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
4. David v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
5. State v. Hughes, 3 Conn. Cir. 181, 209 A.2d 872 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956); Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn.
17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1949).
7. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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ligious belief is bona fide, the court first assures itself that spurious
claims will be forestalled in the lower court proceedings, and second,
avoids the task of deciding which individual sects are contemplated
by the term, "religion."" The appellate court, instead, determines
whether the alleged unconstitutional statute burdens the free exercise of religion and, if so, whether this burden is compelled by some
paramount social interest. Thus, the constitutional problem is met
head on - the court will decide the challenged statute's validity only
if there is a genuine conflict between that statute and the first amendment. Whether a genuine conflict exists is determined by the first two
stages outlined in Sherbert v. Verner, that is, (1) those individuals
who do not hold their religious belief in good faith may not challenge
the statute, and (2) only a statute that imposes some burden on the
free exercise of religion is considered by the appellate court.
If a statute is legitimately challenged, and if it truly imposes some
burden on religious exercises, the court can then balance the necessity.
of protecting the public morals and welfare against maintaining the
free exercise privilege. This balancing test affords the court the opportunity to weigh the conflicting social policies, and thereby protect
religious exercise until the harm caused by unorthodox practices outweighs the benefits derived from the free exercise privilege. This
focal point is determined by applying the third step formulated in
the Sherbert decision, the "compelling state interest" test. In order
for the attacked statute's constitutionality to be upheld, the state
must demonstrate that it has some interest so paramount to the interest of the individual that the maligned religious exercise must be
forsaken for the good of the community. By way of clarifying the
nature of a "compelling state interest," the Court pointed out in
Sherbert that "only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."' Only when the
burden of religious free exercise engenders such abuses and dangers
is the social balance tipped, and the state police power given priority.
Thus, only those religious practices that genuinely threaten the
public safety, health, and morals can be eradicated by the state police
power, and protection for both religious exercises and- the public
welfare is, therefore, maximized.
The Sherbert approach was adopted by the California Supreme
Court in the only other cases dealing with the constitutionality of
narcotics laws as applied to the alleged religious use of peyote. In

8. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); State v. Cubbage, 210
A.2d 555 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965); Fernandez, Free Exercise of Religion, 36 So. CAL.
L. REv. 546 (1962-1963).
9. 574 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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People v. Woody,1° the California court ruled that a statute,11 similar
to those held constitutional in the instant case, was unconstitutional
as applied to the sacramental use of peyote by a tribe of Navaho
Indians. The state conceded that the Navahos used the peyote for
religious purposes in good faith, 12 and it is clear that the law infringed
on the exercise of their religion. As the California statute was applied, it prohibited the further use of peyote, "the cornerstone of the
Peyote religion," in the Indians' religious ceremonies. 1

3

Since the

prosecution failed to show that some compelling state interest justified
the infringement of the defendants' religious practices, the statute
was held unconstitutional. In a companion case, In re Grady,14 the
court granted habeas corpus to a self-styled "peyote preacher," and
remanded the case to a lower court for a factual determination of the
bona fides of the defendant's belief. The court would not decide the
constitutional issue until the question of the defendant's religious
sincerity was settled.
In the instant case the North Carolina court apparently chose
not to follow the Sherbert-Woody rationale. The court expressed some
doubt as to the bona fides of the defendant's alleged religion, but no
factual determination of this issue was ever made by the jury. Instead,
the jury was instructed that even if it found that the defendant
was both a Peyotist and that his possession of the "narcotic" was
for use in religious rites, the first amendment would constitute no
defense for the crime of illegally possessing peyote.15 Nevertheless,
there remains a genuine issue concerning the good faith of defendant's religious assertions. In this regard it should be noted that the
defendant was a member of the Neo-American Church, a religious
organization similar to the Native American Church, whose right
to use peyote in California was confirmed in the Woody decision.
The major difference between the two religions is that the NeoAmerican Church is composed predominantly of white members,
while the Native American Church is predominantly Indian.-6 The
rituals of the two, however, are substantially the same; both worship
peyote as an incarnation of the Spirit of God. 7 The court could,
therefore, have avoided the constitutional question entirely by dismissing or remanding the case on the narrow ground that a finding
10. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
11.

12.

& SAFETY CODE § 1500.
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77
CAL. HEALTH

(1964).
13.

Ibid.

14.
15.
16.
17.

61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1966).
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 3, State v. Bullard, note 15 supra.
Ibid.
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of fact was necessary to determine if the defendant's religious beliefs
were held in good faith.
Assuming arguendo, as the North Carolina court does, that
defendant's belief is held in good faith, the manner in which the
court reconciles the conflict between the police power and the first
amendment rights of the defendant conflicts with the guidelines announced in Sherbert. The court merely asserts that by virtue of the
police power, absolute control over the use and possession of peyote
is within the state's province. Although the opinion exhibits some
state interest in controlling peyote, it neither shows nor purports to
show a compelling state interest - an indispensable element of the
Sherbert test. The court offers no explanation beyond the recital that
peyote causes hallucinations similar to those sometimes found in
cases of schizophrenia, dementia praecox, or paranoia.18 It should
be noted that in most cases, as the Woody decision points out, peyote
causes hallucinations marked by bright and kaleidoscopic colors, geometric patterns, or scenes involving humans or animals, and usually
the drug fosters a feeling of friendliness toward other persons. Moreover, a growing body of scientific literature attests that peyote and
other hallucinogens are reasonably safe when precautions are taken. 19
Furthermore, the legislatures of New Mexico 20 and Montana 2 have
amended their narcotics laws to permit the sacramental use of peyote,
and Arizona has arrived at the same result by judicial decree. 22 It appears that peyote is not as inherently evil as the North Carolina
court assumes. If this is so, it follows a priori that a genuine showing
of a compelling state interest was necessary.
Whether a state can validly forbid the use of peyote - including
its use for religious purposes -is an issue to be determined by the
individual courts in light of the particular facts before them. The
important inquiries revolve around how the state court arrives at
the conclusion to abridge a religious belief. There is no doubt that
22
a state, pursuant to its police power, may proscribe the use of peyote.
18. State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1966).
19. See, e.g., KLuvER, TiE DIVINE PLANT AND ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS (1928);
SLOTKIN, P YoTE RELIGION (1956); DeShon, Rinkel & Solomon, Mental Changes
Experimentally Produced by LSD, 26 PSYCHmTRIC Q. 33 (1952); Sherwood, Stolaroff & Harman, Psychedelic Experience, 4 J. oF NEUROPSYCHIATRY 69 (1962-1963);
Unger, Mescaline, LSD, Psilocybin and Personality Change, 26 PSYCHIATRY 111
(1963); Note, LSD: A Challenge to American Drug Law Philosophy, 19 U. FA.
L. REv. 311 (1966).
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. §54-5-16 (1959).
21. MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. §94-35-123 (1959).
22. Arizona v. Attakai, Criminal No. 4098, Coconino County [Ariz.], July 26,
1960.
23. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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